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The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism  







This study examines whether accounting conservatism plays a risk management role with 
respect to operating cash flow downside risk, a key focus of risk management theory and 
practice. Unconditional (conditional) accounting conservatism is found to substitute for 
(complement) hedging in mitigating operating cash flow downside risk, consistent with its ex 
ante (ex post) application. As confirming evidence, we further document that accounting 
conservatism helps mitigate operating cash flow downside risk by reducing supply chain 
related operational risk. These findings lend support to a risk management role for accounting 
conservatism relevant to related literatures and continuing debates regarding conservatism’s 
role as a pervasive and longstanding property of financial accounting. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G1, M41, G32 
Keywords: accounting conservatism, risk management, cash flow downside risk, 
corporate hedging 
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The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism  
for Operating Cash Flows 
1. Introduction 
This study provides evidence that accounting conservatism plays a risk management role 
for operating cash flows. This relationship is suggested by conservatism’s definition and by 
mixed but suggestive prior findings that conservatism influences the downside properties of 
operating cash flows, a key focus of risk management theory and practice. Consistent with its 
ex ante (ex post) application, we find unconditional (conditional) accounting conservatism 
substitutes for (complements) real corporate hedging in mitigating operating cash flow 
downside risk. Confirmatory tests indicate that accounting conservatism helps reduce 
operating cash flow downside risk by managing operating risk proxied by the maturity 
mismatch between cash holdings and maturing debt, and by customer bargaining power. As 
such, this study provides initial evidence on conservatism’s risk management role and its 
joint usage with hedging in mitigating cash flow downside risk, which extends related 
literatures and helps to inform ongoing deliberations regarding conservatism’s continuing 
role as a central tenet of financial accounting. 
A possible risk management role for accounting conservatism follows from its definition 
as “a prudent reaction to risk and uncertainty to ensure that uncertainty and risk inherent in 
business situations are adequately considered” in Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 of the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (1980, 10). Yet 
despite suggestive but mixed evidence, no previous study directly examines the risk 
management role of accounting conservatism for operating cash flow downside risk. Notably, 
Francis and Martin (2010) find conservatism to improve investor monitoring over 
acquisitions and acquisition profitability that should reduce cash flow downside risk, and, 
Beatty et al. (2012) and Watts and Zuo (2012) find that conservatism promote voluntary 
hedging and alleviates underinvestment during financial crises, respectively. Conversely, 
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Gigler et al. (2009) argue that conservatism triggers inefficient liquidations by hastening 
technical defaults, suggestive of enhanced cash flow downside risk, and Givoly and Hayn 
(2000), Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006), and Jorgensen et al. (2012) suggest that 
conservatism increases earnings volatility and transitory negative earnings shocks. However, 
these studies do not explicitly examine relations between conservatism and operating cash 
flow downside risk. Thus, whether and how conservatism plays a risk management role for 
operating cash flows remains an open empirical question. 
Examining the relation between accounting conservatism and cash flow downside risk is 
significant to the interests of investors and other stakeholders (managers, customers, suppliers, 
employees, etc.). Real risk management instruments, except for cash holdings, require 
specialized business and financial expertise to execute and incur explicit costs, such as 
financial hedging and operating hedging (Disatnik et al. 2012). In contrast, accounting-based 
risk management tools involve less cost and expertise (Pincus and Rajgopal 2002). If 
conservatism manages specific risk exposures and ultimately mitigates cash flow downside 
risk, it provides a low-cost accounting-based risk management tool. Examining 
conservatism’s risk management role is also relevant to ongoing debates regarding the 
benefits, costs, and continuing role of accounting conservatism as a longstanding central tenet 
of financial accounting. The FASB and International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
removed conservatism from their SFAC No. 8 by reasoning that it conflicts with neutrality. 
However, if conservatism plays a risk management role and is related with hedging, a 
reconsideration of its continuing role may be warranted. 
We focus on cash flow downside risk to explore the risk management role of accounting 
conservatism. Cash flow volatility rather than earnings volatility is the traditional focus of 
risk management because it reflects the effects of real risk management activities on firms’ 
operations (Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993; Zhang 2009). In contrast, earnings 
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volatility captures the effects of accounting treatments in addition to the effects of real risk 
management activities (Zhang 2009).1 In our setting, if conservatism manages firm risks and 
generates cash flow consequence, targeting on earnings volatility introduces mechanical 
relations between conservatism and its real risk management consequence and is thus 
inappropriate. Further, we particularly focus on cash flow downside risk rather than cash flow 
volatility because the goal of risk management is to eliminate the lower-tail rather than the 
volatility of cash flow (Stulz 1996; Miller 1998). Rawls and Smithson (1993) concur that 
chief financial officers selectively manage cash flow downside risk rather than its volatility. 
In addition, prospect and decision theories argue that managers, investors, and other firm 
stakeholders are loss averse and more attentive to downside risk than to upside potential (e.g., 
Roy 1952; Menezes et al. 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Koonce et al. 2005). The 
combination of this view with the risk management argument suggests that firm stakeholders 
also prefer to focus on cash flow downside risk for firm risk management activities.2 
We propose and test whether unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism 
mitigate operating cash flow downside risk and whether they serve as a substitute for, and 
complement to hedging, respectively. Our reasoning follows from the definition of 
unconditional (conditional) conservatism as the ex ante (ex post) application of net income 
and net asset reducing accounting treatments that influence operating cash flow downside risk. 
Specifically, by consistently lowering net income and assets, unconditional conservatism 
provides in advance for risk realizations via accrual cushions and precautionary savings (e.g., 
Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan 2010), thus reducing the need for real hedges. If 
unconditional conservatism and real hedges fail to adequately anticipate unexpected risk 
                                                
1 Indeed, the objective of earnings smoothing, one accounting-based risk management tool, is to mitigate earnings volatility 
(Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002). However, unlike accounting conservatism and real risk management instruments, 
earnings smoothing only manages accounting treatments rather than real firm risk exposures.      
2 Particularly, for example, a top shareholder priority is to minimize downside risk and enhance firms’ survival potentials 
(Dutta and Radner 1999), and a debtholder’s primary concern is to lower cash flow risk and default risk.  
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realizations and market shocks, conditional conservatism conveys bad news risk realizations 
that incentivize managers to use hedging to manage risk, and enhances investor monitoring 
over hedging activities (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ball et al. 2008) thus augmenting 
real hedges. By so doing, unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate cash flow 
downside risk. 
We next provide assurance that accounting conservatism affects operating cash flow 
downside risk by managing operational risk, which is incremental to its effect from 
improving investment efficiency or via a mechanical relation between accruals and cash 
flows.3 Specifically, we examine how conservatism manage supply chain disruption risk, one 
type of operational risk, as proxied by maturity mismatch (the ratio of the difference between 
current debt and cash holdings to total assets) and customer bargaining power. Maturity 
mismatch indicates difficulties in servicing debts that can disrupt firm operations from the 
supply side and customer bargaining power reflects disruptions from the customer side. We 
predict that unconditional and conditional conservatism decrease operating cash flow risk by 
managing both types of supply chain disruption risks. 
To test these propositions, we define cash flow downside risk as the probability and 
magnitude that cash flow drops below its expected level, and measure it as cash flow relative 
root lower partial moments (RRLPM), a dummy for high RRLPM, and cash flow at risk, 
extending Stone (1973), Fishburn (1977), and Stein et al. (2001). We add research and 
development (R&D) and advertising expenses back to cash flow to net out their confounding 
effects on cash flow downside risk. Extending Biddle et al. (2013), we measure unconditional 
                                                
3 Francis and Martin (2010) and Ahmed and Duellman (2011), for example, argue and document that conservatism improves 
monitoring over investments, which implies that conservatism decreases cash flow downside risk by improving investment 
efficiency. Dechow (1994), Basu (1997), Dechow et al. (1998), and Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) document negative 
relations of accruals with cash flows and conservatism, which contributes to a mechanical negative relation between 
conservatism and cash flow downside risk. However, examining the indirect effect through operating risk proxies helps 
illustrate how conservatism affects cash flow downside risk through managing operational risk, which is incremental to the 
effects of improving investment efficiency or a mechanical relation. The purpose of this research design is not to refute 
alternative explanations or to test the degree to which risk management accounts for the relation. 
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and conditional conservatism using principal components analysis (PCA) of their respective 
component measures, with conditional conservatism adjusted for asymmetric cash flow 
timeliness (Collin et al. 2012; 2013). We employ logit models and Fama–MacBeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regression models to test the direct relation between conservatism and cash 
flow downside risk, and a system of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that extend 
Baron and Kenny (1986) to examine their indirect relation. We employ an extended Heckman 
(1979) model to investigate relations between conservatism and hedging. 
Empirical tests yield the following main findings: (1) Unconditional and conditional 
conservatism are both negatively associated with subsequent cash flow downside risk, thus 
supporting the proposition that accounting conservatism plays a risk management role for 
cash flow downside risk. (2) Unconditional and conditional conservatism mitigate maturity 
mismatch that in turn increases cash flow downside risk and decreases the influence of 
customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk. These findings lend support to 
conservatism influencing cash flow downside risk via operating risk. (3) Unconditional 
conservatism decreases hedging usage and weakens its mitigating effects on cash flow 
downside risk, whereas conditional conservatism increases hedging usage. These findings are 
consistent with unconditional (conditional) conservatism acting as a substitute for 
(complement to) real hedging. Our results are robust to the effects of investor monitoring, 
earnings smoothing, and alternative measures for cash flow downside risk, maturity 
mismatch, customer bargaining power, and conservatism. 
These findings contribute to several academic literatures. First, this study extends the 
accounting conservatism literature by presenting evidence that unconditional and conditional 
conservatism serve a risk management role for operating cash flow downside risk. Second, 
we document links between accounting conservatism and operating cash flow downside risk 
that suggest a role for conservatism in managing supply- and demand-side operating risk 
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proxied by maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power. In this respect, our results 
extend findings regarding the consequences of unconditional and conditional conservatism on 
investments (Francis and Martin 2010; Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Watts and Zuo 2012) to 
their risk management effects. Our results also complement findings in Biddle et al. (2013) 
that unconditional and conditional conservatism mitigate bankruptcy risk in a debt 
contracting setting by reducing cash flow downside risk and operational risk. 
Third, our findings contribute to research on the coordinated use of risk management 
instruments in accounting, finance, and management. In particular, they extend Beatty et al.’s 
(2012) evidence that conditional conservatism promotes voluntary hedging by focusing 
explicitly on the risk management role of conservatism and documenting differing relations 
and links between unconditional and conditional conservatism conservatism, cash flow 
downside risk and hedging. Our results also extend findings in Barton (2001) and Pincus and 
Rajgopal (2002) that earnings smoothing substitutes for hedging by demonstrating both 
unconditional and conditional conservatism as additional accounting-based risk management 
instruments that interact differentially with  hedging. Our study further complements risk 
management studies on the joint use of “real” risk management instruments such as cash 
holdings, hedging, and lines of credit (Allayannis et al. 2001; Vickery 2008; Bartram et al. 
2010; Gamba and Triantis 2011; Disatnik et al. 2012) by advancing insights into interactions 
between accounting-based and real risk management tools.4 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, 
Section 3 describes the research methodology, Section 4 reports the main empirical results, 
Section 5 conducts further analyses and sensitivity tests, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix 
                                                
4 A role for accounting conservatism as a risk management tool complements findings by Allayannis et al. (2001) and 
Bartram et al. (2010) that the joint usage of operating and financial hedging reduces foreign exchange risk; Vickery (2008) 
that the joint usage of cash holdings and financial hedging reduces interest rate risk in small firms; Gamba and Triantis 
(2011) regarding the joint usage of cash holdings and operational and derivative hedging; and Disatnik et al. (2012) 
regarding associations between cash holdings, derivative hedging, and lines of credit. 
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1 elaborates on cash flow expectation models and Appendix 2 provides variable definitions. 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1  The risk management role of accounting conservatism 
Unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism are natural responses to risk and 
uncertainty (especially downside risk and uncertainty) in a firm’s business environment that 
anticipate potential losses and/or promptly report bad earnings news. This function follows 
from the definition of accounting conservatism (FASB 1980) and from Hsieh et al. (2013), 
who show that accounting conservatism is a natural response to fundamental uncertainty and 
argue that conservatism promotes optimal decision making by managers, investors, and other 
stakeholders. Unconditional conservatism, by consistently understating net assets and net 
income, actuates the accumulation of accrual cushions and precautionary savings 
(Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan 2010; Biddle et al. 2013) that ex ante insulate the firm 
from later risk realizations, in particular those related to operations, thus help buffer shocks to 
future cash flows (Lins et al. 2010). In this sense, unconditional conservatism can serve as an 
ex ante risk management instrument that anticipates downside risk rather than upside 
potential before the risk is realized.5  
In comparison, conditional conservatism, by recognizing realized downside risk ex post, 
cannot by its nature provision for downside risk realizations (Ryan 2006), but rather timely 
reports and controls (downside) risk that was not anticipated by unconditional conservatism 
and/or promotes real risk management tools such as hedging. Conditional conservatism can 
also serve as an ex post risk management instrument that motivates managers and other 
stakeholders to take remedial actions to address downside risk, just before or after risk is 
                                                
5 The argument derives from and is consistent with the definition of unconditional conservatism regardless of whether it 
anticipates or incorporates upside risk. This asymmetric treatment of downside and upside risk has the direct effect of 
biasing the book value of net assets below market value since market value symmetrically reflects both downside and upside 
risk. 
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realized.6 For example, as unexpected product market shocks increase and commodity prices 
drop, the lower-of-market-or-cost inventory valuation rule (a type of conditional 
conservatism) timely books expenses and losses before the product is sold. This timely 
treatment compels managers to take immediate risk management actions, such as postponing 
production or implementing commodity hedging programs to hinder the negative shocks to 
firm operations, thus constraining cash flow downside risk. 
Unconditional and conditional conservatism thus act in a complementary fashion to ex 
ante anticipate and ex post recognize, respectively, a broad range of downside risk exposures 
that are reflected in financial reports and motivate downside cash flow risk controls. They 
differ in this regard from real risk management instruments that typically target a specific risk 
exposure, for example, interest rate swaps that manage interest rate exposures. However, 
Gigler et al. (2009) argue that conservatism’s timely bad earnings news reporting creates 
“false alarms”, which suggests a form of overeaction to risk that can disrupt firm operations 
and risk management activities and thereby increase cash flow downside risk. Nonetheless, 
Gao (2013) alternatively suggests that conservatism counterbalances upward earnings 
management and provides less biased and timelier information. Following this reasoning, we 
propose that unconditional and accounting conservatism serve a risk management role with 
respect to operating cash flow downside risk, as reflected in hypothesis H1: 
Hypothesis H1: Unconditional and conditional conservatism lower operating cash flow 
downside risk. 
Next we address the question about how unconditional and conditional conservatism 
reduce cash flow downside risk by managing firm operational risk. We focus on maturity 
mismatch and customer bargaining power to capture supply chain disruption risks arising 
from suppliers and from customers, respectively. Suppliers care about the cash flow 
                                                
6 The argument derives from and is consistent with the definition of conditional conservatism. Specifically, its asymmetric 
recognition of bad versus good earnings news and corresponding reductions in net book values motivates firm stakeholders 
to take actions that help control operating cash flow downside risks. 
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downside risk of customer firms and the resulting switching costs and losses on relation-
specific investments if major customers experience severe cash flow shortfalls and fail 
unexpectedly. They are also averse to customer failure contagions conveyed by credit sales, 
as implied by Hertzel et al. (2008). A high maturity mismatch signals that a customer may 
have difficulties in paying short-term debts to suppliers and other debtholders. Although there 
is no direct prior evidence, the banking literature suggests that maturity mismatch can 
increase bankruptcy risk and its contagion to suppliers (Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Goldstein 
and Pauzner 2005; Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011). Thus, a high mismatch may induce 
suppliers to shrink or withdraw business from customers with higher levels, especially during 
business downturns, much like depositors withdrawing their savings from a high-mismatch 
banks during credit risk contagions (Gorton 2009; Iyer and Peydró 2011). A high maturity 
mismatch also creates difficulties for customer firms when seeking substitute suppliers. Both 
considerations suggest that high maturity mismatch increases the risk of disruptions to firms’ 
operations from the supply side, which projects to operating cash flow and its downside risk 
if not controlled. Nonetheless, Biddle et al. (2013) document that unconditional and 
conditional conservatism both enhance cash holdings and reduce leverage, suggesting that 
they also constrain maturity mismatch and its associated disruptions and negative shocks to 
firm operations from the supply side. This has direct implications for reducing cash flow 
downside risk in a firm. 
Customer bargaining power increases disruptions to firm operations from the demand 
side since customers with stronger bargaining power can more easily switch to other 
suppliers (Cool and Henderson 1988), thus producing disruptions to supplier firm operations 
that translate into cash flow downside risk. Unconditional and conditional conservatism help 
offset the deleterious effects of customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk by 
reducing bankruptcy and contagion risk to customers (Hertzel et al. 2008; Biddle et al. 2013). 
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Customers care about supplier failure risk because they incur switching costs and losses on 
relation-specific investments if supplier firms experience cash flow shortfalls and fail 
unexpectedly; they also are loathe to bankruptcy contagions spread by suppliers. Hence, 
accounting conservatism, by enhancing customer trust and belief in a firm’s long-term 
viability, encourages longer-term relationships with customers that should mitigate negative 
shocks to cash flows from customers with superior bargaining power, and thereby lower 
operating cash flow downside risk. This reasoning provides the rationales for the following 
hypotheses regarding the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on operating 
cash flow downside risk via operational supply- and demand-side risk proxied by maturity 
mismatch and customer bargaining power, respectively, as expressed below: 
Hypothesis H2a: Unconditional and conditional conservatism lower operating cash flow 
downside risk via a maturity mismatch channel. 
Hypothesis H2b: Unconditional and conditional conservatism lower operating cash flow 
downside risk by reducing the enhancing effect of customer bargaining power. 
2.2 Corporate hedging and the risk management role of accounting conservatism 
As real risk management tools, hedging instruments also mitigate the negative 
externalities of varied market risk exposure to firm operations and ultimately lowers cash 
flow downside risk.7 If unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate cash flow 
downside risk by managing risk like real risk management instruments, a question of interest 
is how conservatism and hedging relate in mitigating cash flow downside risk. By the 
following reasoning, we propose that unconditional (conditional) conservatism, by its ex ante 
(ex post) nature, substitutes for (complements) real hedging in reducing operating cash flow 
                                                
7 For example, interest rate hedging address interest rate risk exposure (Guay 1999; Vickery 2008), foreign exchange 
hedging addresses exposure to foreign exchange risk (Guay 1999; Allayannis et al. 2001; Bartram et al. 2010), and 
commodity price hedging addressed exposure to commodity price risk (Tufano 1996; Jin and Jorion 2006). The relation 
between hedging and cash flow downside risk is actually a largely unaddressed question, although Stulz (1996) and Miller 
(1998) argue that the goal of risk management is to eliminate lower-tail cash flow rather than its total volatility. Some 
hedging instruments mitigate cash flow downside risk at the cost of constraining upside potential. For example, a collar is an 
option that confines the range of possible positive or negative returns on an underlying indicator. However, the purpose for 
entering into such a contract is to confine downside risk and most hedging instruments are designed to decrease varied risk 
exposures, which ultimately project into cash flow downside risk. 
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downside risk. We propose that unconditional conservatism relate negatively to the use and 
effectiveness of real hedging for the following reasons. First, it is consistently applied ex 
ante, and if effective in mitigating the negative effects of (operational) risk on operating cash 
flow downside risk, it is less unnecessary to initiate the more expensive hedging programs 
and maintain on-going ones. Thus, unconditional conservatism is more likely to preempt 
hedging and substitute for the effectiveness of ongoing hedging programs. Second, it is less 
costly to substitute unconditional conservatism for hedging than conversely. Unconditional 
conservatism is the focus of auditors and regulators because it is a major contributor to total 
conservatism and is employed systematically and frequently over a long period (Ryan 2006). 
It is also easier to assess via routine audits and does not engender bad news or regulatory 
“shocks” from which auditors and regulators want to evade their responsibilities (Qiang 
2007). Hence under close monitoring and strict scrutiny by auditors and regulators, managers 
face high disciplinary costs for failure to sufficiently apply unconditional conservatism, for 
example, job loss, legal sanctions, regulatory penalties, and reputational damage. Meanwhile, 
unwinding existing hedging programs does not involve disciplinary costs unless mandated in 
debt covenants as Beatty et al. (2012) show. Therefore, managers dislike substituting 
unconditional conservatism for hedging, and on the contrary, have incentives to unwind 
hedging positions and switch to lower-cost unconditional conservatism. Thus, unconditional 
conservatism acts as a legitimate substitute for hedging usage and effectiveness in mitigating 
operating cash flow downside risk (Koonce et al. 2005).8 
In contrast to unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism is more likely to 
complement to hedging usage and effectiveness for several reasons. First, by reporting bad 
news arising from unexpected asset market shocks in a timely fashion, conditional 
conservatism incentivizes risk- and loss-averse managers to initiate new hedging programs 
                                                
8 Consistent with Disatnik et al. (2012), Koonce et al. (2005) report that investors consider derivatives riskier than non-
derivative instruments even when the underlying economic exposure is held constant. 
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and/or to enhance the effectiveness of existing hedging programs. Second, it enhances the 
monitoring of firm risk management activities by shareholders and debtholders (Ahmed and 
Duellman 2007; Ball et al. 2008). Timely bad news reporting also hastens earnings and asset-
based debt covenant violations, which trigger debtholder monitoring over covenants 
regarding interest rate hedging. Increased debtholder monitoring further enhances voluntary 
hedging that commits firms to meet debt obligations (Bessembinder 1991) and it constrains 
managerial risk-shifting behaviors (Campbell and Kracaw 1990; Beatty et al. 2012). For 
example, Beatty et al. (2012) find conditional conservatism to induce borrower firms to 
voluntarily commit to interest rate swaps. Third, unlike unconditional conservatism, 
conditional conservatism is less likely to substitute for real hedging. Even though it is a less 
costly accounting-based risk management instrument, conditional conservatism cannot 
preclude and preempt a precautionary hedge for a risk it recognizes because it is a smaller 
contributor to conservatism applied ex post and sporadically (Ryan 2006), and thus is also 
impossible to substitute an ongoing hedging program through its consistent application. 
Fourth, managers, auditors, and regulators are disinclined to “bad news” shocks associated 
with conditional conservatism and have incentives to mitigate their negative consequences 
because these shocks induce compensation changes, regulatory attention, and are costly to 
monitor (Qiang 2007). As such, new real hedging is an appealing response to the negative 
shocks conveyed by conditional conservatism. In short, the above reasoning leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H3a: Unconditional conservatism substitutes for hedging usage and hedging 
effectiveness in mitigating operating cash flow downside risk. 
Hypothesis H3b: Conditional conservatism complements hedging usage and hedging 
effectiveness in mitigating operating cash flow downside risk. 
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3. Data, measures and estimation models 
3.1 Data 
We examine a sample of 28,425 firm–year observations with available data for firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for fiscal years 1992 to 2007. We omit firm–years 
in the lower five percent of the total asset distribution to mitigate small denominator bias9 and 
delete industry–years with fewer than twenty observations to estimate cash flow benchmark 
models more accurately. We require at least five years of continuous data for calculating cash 
flow downside risk, which induces a survival bias of some degree. We winsorize all variables 
at the top and bottom one percent of their distributions and exclude firms in the financial and 
utilities industries (Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000–999 and 4900–99, 
respectively). We hand-collect new hedging usage data from 10-K annual reports in the 
Edgar Online database from 1995 to 2007.10 Following Zhang (2009) and Guay (1999), we 
focus on new hedging programs because the inherent business risk for firms with derivative 
positions is unobservable. Data for calculating chief executive officer (CEO) incentives are 
obtained from ExecuComp. 
3.2 Cash flow downside risk measures 
Detailed below are three cash flow downside risk measures used in this study: the 
RRLPM of cash flow Rlpm_OCF, an indicator that cash flow drops below its expected level 
DOCF, and cash flow at risk CFaR. The measure DOCF is a dummy variable, the simplest of 
the three but insensitive to the magnitude of cash flow downside risk; Rlpm_OCF considers 
the magnitude of cash flow downside risk and incorporates all loss levels; CFaR considers 
only the extreme loss case and is computationally complex. 
3.2.1 Cash flow downside risk measures within the RRLPM framework 
Cash flow downside risk measures Rlpm_OCF and DOCF belong to the RRLPM 
                                                
9 We follow Stein et al. (2001) to do so. Our results do not qualitatively change when the 1 percent cutoff is used. 
10 The 10-K annual reports for U.S. listed firms in the Edgar Online database are available for fiscal years 1994 to 2007. 
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framework derived from the concept of lower partial moment (LPM) that means including 
only the downside distribution of a variable relative to its reference level in moment 
calculation (Stone 1973; Fishburn 1977). The continuous case of cash flow LPM for firm i, 
LPMα(τ:i), is expressed by the cumulative distribution function  
( )LPM : ( ) , 0i i ii f d
τ α
α τ τ γ γ γ α−∞= − ≥∫  (1) 
where τ is the cash flow target level, f(γi) is the probability density function for firm i’s cash 
flow, and α is a moment indicator that reflects the relative importance of the magnitude by 
which cash flow deviates below its target level.11 The discrete case of firm i’s cash flow LPM 
when α = 2 is  
( ) 22
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where N is the number of observations for calculating the cash flow LPM. The root of the 
cash flow LPM, RLPM, possesses linear homogeneity of degree one such that changes in τ 
and in the RLPM are proportional; its discrete case for firm i when α = 2 is  
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∑  (3) 
Corresponding to the cash flow RLPM, we also estimate a root upper partial moment of 
cash flow, RUPM, which captures cash flow upside potential. Since a higher RUPM usually 
accompanies a higher RLPM, we construct a relative RLPM measure RRLPM, which 
deflates RLPM by RUPM to control for firm-level differences in upside potential, such that 
cash flow downside risk is comparable across firms. RRLPM further applies a logarithmic 
transformation to normalize the distribution of the cash flow RLPM. 
                                                
11 For α = 0, the magnitude does not matter and LPMα(τ:i) collapses into an indicator of below-target cash flow. For α = 1 
and α = 2, LPMα(τ:i) is consistent with below-target shortfall and semi-variance, but not with a mere shortfall or semi-
variance, since even for symmetric distribution cash flow LPM differs from its shortfalls or semi-variance if the target cash 
flow deviates from the sample mean.  
In addition, Eq. (1) suggests that the relation between cash flow level and cash flow LPM is not necessarily linearly negative 
but depends on the tradeoffs between two countervailing forces. Intuitively, cash flow increases cash flow sufficiency and 
thus reduces cash flow shortfalls, but the sample mean of cash flow (and thus cash flow level) increases cash flow downside 
risk monotonically, as suggested by Stone (1973). 
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Cash flow RRLPM Rlpm_OCF. Rlpm_OCF refers to the ranked natural logarithm of the 
ratio of one plus the cash flow RLPM to one plus the cash flow RUPM, both estimated over a 
three-year horizon covering the current and previous two years: 
Rlpm_OCFit = log[(1 + RLPM2(OCFit)/(1 + RUPM2(OCFit)]    (4) 
where RLPM2(OCFit) = [(1/3)Σ((έit*Iέit≤0)2]1/2 and RUPM2(OCFit) = [(1/3)Σ((έit*Iέit≥0))2]1/2, 
representing the cash flow RLPM and RUPM, respectively. Iέit≤0 is an indicator that equals 
one if έit < 0 and zero otherwise, where έit is the residual estimated from the industry-specific 
OLS regressions of the cash flow expectation model  
OCFit = β0 + β1OCFit-1 + β2OCFit-2 + β3OCFit-3 + β4SALEit-1 + β5Sizeit-1 (5) 
             + β6LEVERAGEit-1 + β7STD_OCFit-1 + Year_Dummies + εit 
where OCF is the ratio of annual cash flow adjusted for R&D expenditures and advertising to 
total assets. This adjustment is to ensure that the estimated Rlpm_OCF is free of the effects of 
expensing R&D and marketing expenditures under Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) No. 2 and No. 142, and thus reflects only cash flow shortfalls. Eq. (5) 
incorporates cash flow level and volatility (Minton et al. 2002) and other cash flow 
determinants such as firm size, sales (Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998), and leverage. 
Further model details are described in Appendix 1. 
Cash flow RLPM indicator DOCF. DOCF is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
actual cash flow is below its expectation estimated from Eq. (5) and zero otherwise. 
3.2.2 Cash flow downside risk measures within the VaR framework 
Cash flow at risk CFaR. CFaR refers to the ranked ratio of the worst case of quarterly 
cash flow at the one percent confidence level to the predicted quarterly cash flow estimated 
from Eq. (6) below. We employ a comparables approach to calculate CFaR over a rolling 
window of seventeen fiscal quarters, extending Stein et al. (2001):12 
                                                
12 CFaR falls within the framework of value at risk (VaR), the potential loss in value of a risky asset or portfolio over a 
defined period for a given confidence interval. However, unlike VaR, CFaR focuses on the overall cash flow effects of all 
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OCFQt = β0 + β1OCFQt-1 + β2OCFQt-2 + β3OCFQt-3 + β4OCFQt-4 + β5OCFQt-5 (6) 
 + γ1Q1 + γ2Q2+ γ3Q3 + εt 
where OCFQ is the ratio of quarterly cash flow adjusted for R&D and advertising 
expenditures to total assets, with the adjustment to ensure that CFaR is free from the effects 
of immediately expensing R&D and marketing expenditures under SFAS No. 2 and No. 142, 
and thus reflects only cash flow insufficiency. 
3.3 Accounting conservatism measures 
Unconditional conservatism is measured using UC_PCA, the factor score from a principal 
components analysis of three component unconditional conservatism measures following 
Biddle et al. (2013): UC_ACC (total accrual, adapted from Ahmed et al. 2002), UC_BM (the 
ranked industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio), and UC_RES (hidden reserve in Penman and 
Zhang 2002). Extending Biddle et al. (2013), conditional conservatism is measured using 
CC_PCA, the factor score generated from a principal components analysis of three 
conditional conservatism measures, where CC_AR and CC_CR are adjusted for asymmetric 
cash flow timeliness and then denoted CC_ARA and CC_CRA respectively. This adjustment 
removes from conditional conservatism the effects of asymmetric cash flow timeliness that 
overstate market-based conditional conservatism measures (Collin et al. 2012, 2013) and add 
noise to tests for the effects of conditional conservatism on cash flow downside risk.13 
CC_ARA. CC_ARA is the ranked ratio of the sum of the CScore_ACC and GScore_ACC 
to the GScore_ACC estimated from an extended Khan and Watts (2009) model that replaces 
earnings with accruals to retain only asymmetric accrual timeliness. 14  CScore_ACC 
                                                                                                                                                  
types of risk exposure rather than the value effect and uses expected cash flow estimated from the quarterly cash flow model 
as a deflator to facilitate cross-sectional comparisons between firms.  
The comparables approach is a nonparametric method that sorts firms with similar risk features into pools of comparable 
peers to construct samples of negative cash flow shocks for estimating tail probabilities. 
13 Asymmetric cash flow timeliness could inflate CC_AR and CC_CR and increase cash flow downside risk simultaneously, 
leading to a spurious positive relation between them, which weakens the power of our hypothesis testing. Therefore, it is 
important in this study to net out asymmetric cash flow timeliness from conditional conservatism measures. 
14  We estimate the following model for fiscal years 1990 to 2007, extending Khan and Watts (2009): 
ACCit = b1 + b2DRit + Rit*(m1 + m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4LEVit) + DRit*Rit (l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit)  
Then GScore_ACCit = m1 + m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4 LEVit = -1.89539 + Sizeit*0.5239 - M/Bit*0.0367- LEVit*1.7393 
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(GScore_ACC) score denotes the timeliness of bad (good) accruals news. 
CC_CRA. CC_CRA is the ranked ratio of current accrual shocks to total accrual news 
multiplied by negative one for good accrual news. It focuses on the asymmetric timeliness of 
bad relative to good accrual news, extending Callen et al. (2010) and Biddle et al. (2013).15 
3.4 Estimation methodology and models 
3.4.1 Direct tests for the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on cash flow 
downside risk 
Eq. (7) tests H1 regarding the direct effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism 
on subsequent cash flow downside risk, with H1 predicting γ1 < 0: 
DR_OCFit = γ0 + γ1CONit-1 + Controlsit + εit (7) 
where DR_OCF refers to cash flow downside risk measures DOCF, Rlpm_OCF, or CFaR; 
CON refers to unconditional conservatism proxies UC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM, and 
UC_RES and conditional conservatism metrics CC_PCA, CC_ACM, CC_ARA, and CC_CRA. 
                                                                                                                                                  
     CScore_ACCit = l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit = 3.3696 - Size*0.9200 + M/Bit*0.0456 + LEVit*2.75340 
We also estimate the model for individual industry and individual firms with the results qualitatively unchanged. 
15 Specifically, we replace earnings with accruals (acc) and cash flow (cf) in the return decomposition model: 














j rρ = Nacc + Ncf – Nr 
where Δ denotes first differencing, Et is an expectation operator, ΔEt-1 = Et(.) - Et-1(.), ρ is a constant discount rate term, it = 
log(1 + rft), rft is the risk-free rate in period t, rt = log(1 + rett) - it, rett is the equity return (cum dividend) in period t, acct = 























j rρ . 



























Then we estimate 
 Nacc t =ΔEt = rt - Et-1(rt) + Nrt – Ncft = ρe2′(I -ρA))-1ηt 
where ηt refers to the vector (η1t,  η2t, η3t  η4t)’, I is an identity matrix, and A is a parameter matrix. We then calculate CC_CRA 
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Eq. (7) is a logit model for DOCF and a Fama–MacBeth (1973) model for Rlpm_OCF and 
CFaR. Controlsit include identified determinants of cash flow downside risk.16 
3.4.2 Indirect tests for the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism via maturity 
mismatch and customer bargaining power 
Extending Baron and Kenny (1986), we employ the following system of equations to test 
H2a and H2b regarding the indirect effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on 
cash flow downside risk via supply chain disruption risk proxied by maturity mismatch and 
customer bargaining power. The first OLS model (Eq. 8) regresses unconditional and 
conditional conservatism on a specific risk measure, their common risk, governance, and 
industry determinants. The estimated residuals are thus largely free from the effects of 
reverse causality, endogeneity between the two types of conservatism, common risk, 
governance, and industry factors and are used to replace the original conservatism values in 
the later-stage regressions. The second OLS model (Eq. 9) regresses a specific risk variable 
Risk on the residuals of unconditional and conditional conservatism estimated from Eq. (8), 
UC_R and CC_R, and other controls. The third OLS model (Eq. 10) regresses future cash 
flow downside risk Rlpm_OCF on the residual estimated from Eq. (9) Risk_R; UC_R and 
CC_R from Eq. (8); their interactions; and other determinants of Rlpm_OCF. Note that we 
use the residual from Eq. (9) rather than the original value of risk to address the concern that 
conservatism causes a spurious relation between a risk variable and cash flow downside risk. 
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2Riskit-1 + α3ROA it-1 + α4 Sizeit-1 + α5Leverageit-1 (8) 
+ ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + υit-1 
Riskit  = b0 + b1 UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2 CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls1it + εit, (9)17 
                                                
16  Particularly, these control variables include capital investment intensity Invest_Capx, R&D investment intensity 
Invest_RD, organizational slack SLACK, human resource slack SLACK_EMP, firm size Size, return on total assets ROA, 
leverage ratio Leverage, operating options OO, past return volatility Sigma, CEO effort-taking incentives CEO_Delta and 
CEO risk-taking incentives CEO_Vega, and dummies for Fama–French (1997) industry classifications, Ind, and for fiscal 
years, Year. There is no consensus regarding the sources of cash flow downside risk in the literature. Zhang (2009) suggests 
that the determinants of cash flow volatility include the intensity of plant, property, and equipment (-), Size (-), Invest_RD 
(+), Leverage (+), Sigma (+), CEO_Delta (-), and CEO_Vega (+). Similarly, Ang et al. (2006) document a high downside 
beta in firms with high return on equity, small firm size, high asset growth, low book-to-market ratio, high return volatility, 
high past downside betas, and past winners. Other studies show that past organizational slackness (Miller and Reuler 1996) 
and operating options proxied by capitalized fixed assets (Driouchi and Bennett 2010) reduce downside risk. 
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Rlpm_OCFit = γ0 + γ1Risk_Rit-1 + γ2Risk_Rit-1*UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ3Risk_Rit-1* (10) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ4UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ5CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls2it-1 + µit 
where CON = UC_PCA or CC_PCA and Risk = Mismatch or Rsize. H2a predicts b1 > 0, b2 > 
0, and γ5 < 0 for the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on cash flow 
downside risk via the maturity mismatch channel; H2b predicts γ2 < 0 and γ3 < 0 to reflect 
their mitigation of the adverse effects customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk. 
3.4.3 Extended Heckman (1979) model for relations between conservatism and hedging 
We use the extended Heckman (1979) model below to test H3a and H3b regarding 
relations between accounting conservatism and hedging. The model augments the Heckman 
(1979) model in two respects: (1) It adds two OLS regressions (Eq. 11) before the probit 
model, which regress UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively, on the hedging indicator Hedger 
and their common risk and governance determinants, to control for reverse causality from 
hedging to conservatism and their common risk, governance, and industry factors; (2) it 
employs a difference-in-differences specification in the last-stage OLS regression (Eq. 13) 
because examining only firms that initiate hedging programs (treatment firms) yields biased 
results when other changes coincide with the initiation of new hedging programs. 18 
Specifically, Eq. (12) is a probit model that regresses a firm’s propensity to be a Hedger on 
residuals from Eq. (11), UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, and other hedging determinants to 
examine the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on hedging decisions.19 Eq. 
                                                                                                                                                  
17 Controls1 differs in terms of dependent variable, maturity mismatch Mismatch, or customer bargaining power CBP. For 
Mismatch, Controls1 includes firm size Size, return on assets ROA, capital ratio CAP, bond market liquidity spread Repo, 
change in the three-month T-bill rate 3M, and industrial and year dummies, extending Kim et al. (2013). For customer 
bargaining power CBP, Controls1 includes industry and year dummies.  
18 We use firms that have never initiated any hedging programs as control firms. In our specification, the first differencing 
level is the change in unconditional or conditional conservatism before and after the initiation of a hedging program for each 
treatment firm. The second differencing level is the change in unconditional or conditional conservatism between control and 
treatment firms, to remove the impact of other changes concurrent with the initiation of new hedging programs from the 
first-level differencing. The implicit assumption is that other changes affect both treatment and control firms similarly. 
19 Determinants of derivative hedging identified in the risk management literature (Smith and Stulz 1985; Graham and Smith 
1999; Barton 2001; Zhang 2009) include: firm size Size (+), leverage ratio Leverage (+), profitability ROA (+), growth 
opportunities Invest_RD (+), underinvestment Leverage*Invest_RD (+), interest burden INT_BD (+), tax convexity NOL (+), 
return volatility Sigma (-), information asymmetry BAS (-), CEO effort-taking incentives CEO_ Delta (-), CEO risk-taking 
incentives CEO_Vega (+), and IND and Year dummies. Specifically, Size controls for the scale of the economy in hedging 
and Leverage and ROA proxy for incentives for using derivatives to reduce expected costs of financial distress and to 
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(13) is a difference-in-differences OLS model that regresses future Rlpm_OCF against 
UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, Hedger, their interactions, the inverse Mills ratio estimated 
from Eq. (12) Mills, and other controls. H3a predicts b1 > 0 and γ2 > 0 for UC_PCA; H3b 
predicts b1 < 0 and γ3 < 0 for CC_PCA; and H3a and H3b predict γ1 < 0. 
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2Rlpm_OCFit-1 + α3ROA it-1 + α4Sizeit-1 + (11) 
   α5Leverageit-1 + α6CEO_Deltait-1 + α7CEO_Vegait-1+ b9Hedgerit 
    + ΣbnIndn + ΣboYearo + υit 
Hedgerit = b0 + b1UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls3it-1 + εit (12) 
Rlpm_OCFit = γ0 +γ1Postit*Hedgerit +γ2Hedgerit*UC_PCA_Rit-1*Postit + (13) 
γ3Hedgerit*CC_PCA_Rit-1*Postit + γ4UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ5CC_PCA_Rit-1 
    + γ6Postit + γ7Millsit-1 + Controls4it + µit 
4. Main empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in empirical tests. Table 
2 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the major testing variables 
separately, above and below the diagonal, respectively, and indicates strong correlations 
between them. Specifically, the three cash flow downside risk measures (DOCF, Rlpm_OCF, 
CFaR) are significantly negatively correlated with unconditional conservatism measure 
UC_PCA and its component measures UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES, as well as with 
conditional conservatism metric CC_PCA and its component measures CC_ACM, CC_ARA, 
and CC_CRA, except that CFaR exhibits a positive Spearman (Pearson) correlation with 
CC_ARA (CC_CRA). These results provide initial evidence that unconditional and 
conditional conservatism are negatively associated with cash flow downside risk, consistent 
with H1. The Pearson and Spearman correlations of the cash flow downside risk measures 
with maturity mismatch Mismatch are typically positive and most are significant; those with 
                                                                                                                                                  
facilitate external financing and are positively associated with increased incentives to use derivatives to prevent drops in 
profitability when firm performance is good. Leverage*Invest_RD and Invest_RD proxy for growth opportunities and 
incentives to use hedging to mitigate underinvestment problems, respectively. INT_BD captures hedging incentives from 
increased interest burden, NOL captures taxation convexity incentives for hedging, and CEO_Vega and CEO_Delta capture 
managerial risk-averse and risk-taking incentives for hedging, respectively, with CEO_Vega (CEO_Delta) predicted to be 
positively (negatively) associated with hedging (Guay 1999; Zhang 2009). 
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the hedging indicator Hedger are consistently negative, suggesting that corporate hedging 
reduces cash flow downside risk. Their correlations with customer bargaining power measure 
Rsize are inconsistent. 
4.2 Unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk 
Table 3 reports estimation results for testing H1 regarding the direct effects of 
unconditional and conditional conservatism on cash flow downside risk. Models 1 to 3 
present the logit model results from regressing the cash flow downside risk indicator DOCF 
on lagged unconditional and conditional conservatism and other controls, Models 4 to 6 
present Fama–MacBeth regression results for the cash flow downside risk measure 
Rlpm_OCF, and Models 7 to 9 present Fama–MacBeth regression results for the cash flow 
downside risk measure CFaR. In Models 1 and 2 the unconditional and conditional 
conservatism measures UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1 are significantly negatively associated 
with DOCFit. When they enter the regression together in Model 3, they remain significantly 
negatively associated with DOCFit, with coefficients (t-statistics) -0.4507 (-4.85) and -0.1505 
(-2.60), respectively, although their coefficients (t-statistics) are smaller compared with 
Models 1 and 2. These results strongly support H1 for cash flow downside risk proxied by 
DOCF. 
Models 3 to 6 indicate that UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1 are significantly negatively 
associated with Rlpm_OCFit when considered independently (in Models 3 and 4) or together 
(in Model 6). Model 6 shows that the coefficients (t-statistics) of UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1 
are -0.0158 (-1.96) and -0.0595 (16.49), respectively. The economic meaning is that a one 
standard deviation increase in UC_PCAit-1 (CC_PCAit-1), which is 0.2170 (0.3283), leads to a 
decrease of 34.50 (195.34) basis points in subsequent Rlpm_OCFit. These results suggest that 
both unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce future cash flow downside risk 
proxied by cash flow RLPM through managing firm risk, thus corroborating H1. Models 7 to 
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9 likewise show UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1 to be significantly negatively associated with 
cash flow downside risk measure CFaRit when they enter a regression independently or 
together. These findings suggest that unconditional and conditional conservatism, thus 
lending added support to H1. Measures for CFaR based on confidence levels of five percent 
and ten percent yield qualitatively similar results.20  
4.3 Maturity mismatch, customer bargaining power, and relations between unconditional 
and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk 
Table 4 presents the regression results for testing H2a and H2b that unconditional and 
conditional conservatism mitigate cash flow downside risk via the maturity mismatch channel 
and by constraining the detrimental effects of customer bargaining power, respectively. We 
measure maturity mismatch as the ratio of the difference between current debt and cash 
holdings to total assets and denote it Mismatch. We estimate customer bargaining power 
Rsize as the ratio of the average market value of a customer’s industry to the supply firm’s 
equity market value, and then deflate it by 100, following Hui et al. (2012). The untabulated 
first-stage OLS regressions orthogonalize unconditional and conditional conservatism against 
maturity mismatch or customer bargaining power respectively together with other controls.21 
The maturity mismatch regression reported in Table 4 shows that UC_PCA_Rit-1 and 
CC_PCA_Rit-1 are significantly negatively associated with subsequent maturity mismatch 
Mismatchit, with coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0721 (-13.47) and -0.0104 (-4.37), 
respectively. The economic interpretation is that a one standard deviation increase in 
unconditional (conditional) conservatism, which is 0.2170 (0.3283), reduces maturity 
                                                
20  The control variables coefficients are generally consistent with expectations. Leverage is significantly positively 
associated with cash flow downside risk in all models, consistent with the intuition that distressed firms suffer more shocks 
to operations and thus have higher cash flow downside risk; R&D investment is significantly negatively related with cash 
flow downside risk consistent with R&D signaling cash flow upside potential; ROA, operational options OO, CEO risk-
averse incentives and CEO_Delta are negatively related with cash flow downside risk. 
21 We use the estimated residuals UC_PCA_Rit-1 and CC_PCA_Rit-1 to proxy for unconditional and conditional conservatism 
respectively in later stage tests for maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power. 
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mismatch by 156.5 (34.14) basis points. This evidence is supportive of unconditional and 
conditional conservatism serving to alleviate disruptions to firm supply and operations. In 
turn, the estimated residual from the mismatch regression, Mismatch_Rit-1, is significantly 
positively associated with subsequent cash flow downside risk Rlpm_OCFit in the third-stage 
OLS regression, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0184 (3.75). That means a one standard 
deviation increase in maturity mismatch, which is 0.1358, increases Rlpm_OCFit by 25.00 
basis points. The result is consistent with a high mismatch being associated with disruptions 
to firm operations from the supply side that translate into increased cash flow downside risk. 
It also suggests that maturity mismatch works as a mediating channel by which unconditional 
and conditional conservatism reduce cash flow downside risk. The meditating effect of 
mismatch is equal to -0.0013 (= 0.0184*(-0.0721)) for unconditional conservatism and -
0.0002 (=0.0184*(-0.0104)) for conditional conservatism. Altogether, these findings lend 
support to H2a regarding the maturity mismatch channel. 
The rightmost two columns of Table 4 report estimation results regarding the indirect 
effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism for reducing the effects of customer 
bargaining power on firm operations and cash flow downside risk. Consistent with 
predictions, the OLS regression for customer bargaining power Rsize shows that 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA_Rit-1 and CC_PCA_Rit-1, 
respectively, are insignificantly associated with customer bargaining power Rsize, consistent 
with the intuition that conservatism in a supplier firm does not affect customer bargaining 
power because the latter is mainly determined by the customer firm’s industry- and firm-
specific characteristics. Although conservatism does not affect customer bargaining power 
per se, it can still moderate the detrimental effects of customer bargaining power on cash 
flow downside risk. The last OLS regression for Rlpm_OCF reported in Table 4 indicates that 
the interactions of the two types of conservatism with customer bargaining power, 
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UC_PCA_Rit-1*Rsize_Rit-1 and CC_PCA_Rit-1*Rsize_Rit-1, are significantly negatively 
associated with subsequent cash flow downside risk Rlpm_OCFit, with coefficients (t-
statistics) -0.0026 (-2.24) and -0.0157 (-2.97), respectively. The economic meaning is that a 
one standard deviation increase in unconditional (conditional) conservatism weakens the 
enhancing effect of customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk by 5.64 (51.54) 
basis points. Thus, this evidence is consistent with accounting conservatism helping to reduce 
the adverse effects on operating downside cash flow risk of disruptions to firms’ operations 
from the customer side as predicted by H2b. 
4.4 Corporate hedging and relations between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism and cash flow downside risk 
Table 5 presents results for examining H3a and H3b regarding relations between 
conservatism and hedging using an extended three-stage Heckman (1979) model. The first-
stage OLS regressions reported in the first two columns of Table 5 address reverse causality 
from hedging to conservatism and indicate that the hedging firm indicator Hedger is 
significantly positively associated with unconditional and conditional conservatism, UC_PCA 
and CC_PCA, respectively. This result implies that hedging firms tend to choose higher 
levels of accounting conservatism. The third column reports the results of probit model 
regression for the hedging indicator Hedger and shows that lagged unconditional 
conservatism UC_PCAit-1 is significantly negatively associated with the probability that a 
firm initiates a new hedging program, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.1587 (-1.64). These 
findings imply that unconditional conservatism reduces and substitutes for hedging usage in 
managing risk. In contrast, lagged conditional conservatism CC_PCAit-1 is significantly 
positively associated with the probability that a firm initiates a new hedging program, with a 
coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0705 (1.77). This evidence is consistent with the prediction of H3a 
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that timely risk warnings via conditional conservatism promote and complement hedging 
usage.22 
The last column reports third-stage difference-in-differences OLS regression results for 
Rlpm_OCF. Consistent with expectations, the initiation of a hedging program significantly 
reduces subsequent cash flow downside risk, as indicated by the significantly negative 
coefficient of -0.0108 for the interaction item Hedger*Post. In line with Smith and Stulz 
(1985), Stulz (1996), and Campello et al. (2011), this result indicates that corporate hedging 
directly reduces specific risk exposures and weakens their detrimental effects on firm 
operations and investments, which ultimately projects into a decrease in cash flow downside 
risk. Combined with the findings for the probit model that unconditional conservatism 
reduces hedging usage, this result further reconfirms that unconditional conservatism 
substitutes for hedging usage in decreasing cash flow downside risk, thus corroborating H3a. 
Combined with the second-stage results that conditional conservatism complements hedging 
usage, this evidence also reconfirms that conditional conservatism stimulates and 
complements hedging usage, which reduces subsequent cash flow downside risk and thus 
corroborates H3b. A likely explanation is that by signaling bad news in a timely fashion, 
conditional conservatism promotes the initiation of productive new hedging programs that 
help mitigate operating cash flow downside risk. 
The third-stage results confirm that the interaction of UC_PCA_R, Hedger, and Post is 
significantly positively associated with cash flow downside risk, with a coefficient (t-statistic) 
0.0580 (2.31). The evidence suggests that unconditional conservatism also weakens hedging 
effectiveness for mitigating cash flow downside risk, thus supporting H3b regarding the 
effect of unconditional conservatism on hedging effectiveness. By comparison, the third-
                                                
22 The results for the controlling variables in the second-stage regression are generally consistent with the risk management 
literature. In particular, INT_BD, Leverage, Leverage*Invest_RD, ROA, and Size are positively associated with all hedging 
types, whereas the coefficients of BAS and SIGMA are negative. 
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stage finding that the interaction of conditional conservatism CC_PCA_R with Hedger and 
Post, CC_PCA_R *Hedger* Post, is insignificantly associated with cash flow downside risk 
does not support H3b for conditional conservatism complementing hedging effectiveness. 
Thus, this finding conveys that conditional conservatism complements hedging by 
stimulating hedging usage rather than hedging effectiveness. 
5. Further analysis and sensitivity tests 
5.1 Investor monitoring and the risk management role of accounting conservatism 
An alternative explanation for the observed negative relation between conservatism and 
cash flow downside risk is that investor monitoring both enhances conservatism and reduces 
cash flow downside risk. To address this possibility, we use a two-stage least squares model 
to determine whether our main results are robust to investor monitoring. Specifically, the first 
stage OLS model regresses unconditional or conditional conservatism on variables for 
monitoring by investors including blockholders, shareholders, and debtholders. We use the 
negative of GScore to represent blockholder monitoring (Gompers et al. 2003), percentage 
institutional ownership to proxy for institutional shareholder monitoring, and the ratio of 
long-term debt to total long-term and short-term debts to represent debtholder monitoring. 
We then use the estimated residuals to replace their original values to net out the effect of 
investor monitoring on conservatism.23 Table 6 reports the estimation results indicating that 
all measures for investor monitoring increase unconditional and conditional conservatism, 
with a significantly positive coefficient for institutional ownership. More significantly, the 
second-stage OLS regression for Rlpm_OCF indicates that both types of conservatism 
                                                
23 Gscore gauges the balance of power between shareholders and top executives (Gompers et al. 2003). Using data on 
twenty-four governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center and state takeover law data for 
three years—1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998—Gompers et al. (2003) construct Gscore for each firm in their sample by adding 
one point for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. Thus, a higher Gscore indicates less power for shareholders 
and hence a less well-governed firm and the higher the negative of Gscore, the greater the power of shareholders and hence a 
better-governed firm. We obtain data for GScore and board structure from RiskMetrics, data for institutional shareholdings 
from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database, and data for board duality information from ExecuComp, as 
indicated by a current CEO with the title chairman, chmn, Chairman, CHAIRMAN, Chmn, or CHMN. 
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continue to significantly decrease subsequent cash flow downside risk, confirming that their 
relation is robust to the effects of investor monitoring. Thus, the results in Table 6 suggest 
that unconditional and conditional conservatism play a risk management role for operating 
cash flow downside risk beyond of the effects of investor monitoring. 
5.2 Firm size and the risk management role of accounting conservatism 
Small firms are often financially constrained and small firm size is considered an 
important rationale for firms to engage in risk management activities (e.g., Froot et al. 1993). 
The risk management literature in finance further finds small firms to be sensitive to interest 
rate shocks (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; Ehrmann 2000). To reduce the possibility that 
our results are influenced by these effects, we control for firm size in all regression results 
reported above.  When we further omit the lowest tercile of observations sorted by firm size, 
untablulated results confirm that our main results are qualitatively unchanged for the 
subsample of large firm observations. 
5.3 Earnings smoothing and the risk management role of accounting conservatism 
Earnings smoothing is an accrual-based risk management tool that reduces earnings 
volatility and substitutes for hedging (Barton 2001). It also can be characterized as 
“conservatism gaming,” whereby a higher level of conservatism is applied in good economic 
times and a lower level of conservatism in bad times (Biddle et al. 2013). We expect the risk 
management role of conservatism to be insensitive to the effect of earnings smoothing 
because conservatism targets real firm risk, rather than earnings volatility, and actually 
increases earnings volatility as suggested by Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005, 2006), and Jorgensen et al. (2012). In contrast, the primary objective of earnings 
smoothing is not to manage real firm risk but rather to reduce earnings volatility (Barton 
2001). Adding innate and discretionary smoothing as additional controls to Eq. (7) yields 
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qualitatively similar results.24 
5.4 Alternative Rlpm_OCF-based cash flow downside risk measures 
To confirm that our main results are robust to different cash flow expectation models for 
calculating the cash flow downside risk measure Rlpm_OCF, we examine the following 
alternative cash flow benchmarks: the previous year’s industry mean cash flow, the mean of 
firm-specific cash flow in the previous five years, and zero cash flow. We denote the cash 
flow RRLPMs thus calculated as DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre, and DR_OCFzero, respectively. 
To examine whether our results are robust to alternative formula specifications for defining 
Rlpm_OCF, we alternatively define Rlpm_OCF2 as the natural logarithm of one plus the cash 
flow RLPM without deflating by the cash flow RUPM and define Rlpm_OCF3 as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the cash flow RLPM deflated by the standard deviation of cash flow. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the estimation results and reveals that the negative relations 
between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow risk are robust to these 
alternative Rlpm_OCF measures. In addition, to address the concern that the CFaR measure 
may be unreliable because the quarterly cash flow expectation model involves eight 
independent variables and is estimated using seventeen firm–quarter observations, we drop 
the quarter dummies with qualitatively unchanged results. 
5.5 Alternative unconditional and conditional conservatism measures 
Next we examine whether our main results are robust to alternative unconditional 
conservatism measures proxied by the component measures of UC_PCA, namely, UC_ACC, 
UC_BM, and UC_RES. We likewise examine three alternative conditional conservatism 
measures, the component measures of CC_PCA: CC_AM, CC_ARA, and CC_CRA. Using 
these measures, we re-examine Eq. (7) for relations between conservatism and cash flow 
                                                
24 We measure Innate smoothing as the product of negative one times the Spearman correlation between total accruals, and 
cash flow and discretionary smoothing as the product of negative one times the ratio of the standard deviations of net income 
to cash flow. 
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downside risk and report the results in Panels B to D of Table 7. Models 1 to 6 in Panels B to 
D indicate that these measures are significantly negatively associated with subsequent cash 
flow downside risk measures DOCFit, Rlpm_OCFit, and CFaRit, respectively, except that 
UC_ACCit-1, UC_BMit-1, and CC_ARAit-1 have insignificant coefficients in Panels B, C, and D, 
respectively.25  
We also use negative one times earnings skewness relative to cash flow skewness, SKEW, 
as a conditional conservatism measure, but we use its predicted value from the following 
model to net out asymmetrical cash flow timeliness: 
SKEWit = β0 + β1UC_ACCit + β2CC_ACMit + εit. (14) 
We denote the predicted SKEWit CC_Skew and calculate CC_PCAA as the factor score 
generated from a PCA of CC_Skew, CC_ACM, and CC_CRA. Panel E of Table 7 reports the 
results showing that CC_Skew and CC_PCAA are significantly negatively associated with 
Rlpm_OCF and CFaR, except for the insignificant results for DOCF, suggesting that our 
results are insensitive to using CC_Skew and CC_PCAA as alternative conditional 
conservatism measures. Altogether, the results of Table 7 indicate that the relations between 
unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk observed above are 
robust to alternative measures. 
5.6 Alternative measures for maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power 
We also consider alternative measures for maturity mismatch Mismatcha and customer 
bargaining power RHHI. Mismatcha is the ratio of current liabilities minus cash holdings to 
total assets and RHHI is the concentration ratio of a customer’s four-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry relative to that of the firm’s. RHHI extends 
                                                
25 A possible concern is that these results are influenced by R&D and marketing expenditures that increase cash flow 
downside risk and hidden reserves and thus unconditional conservatism Penman and Zhang 2002), which creats a spurious 
relation between conservatism and cash flow downside risk, particularly when R&D is financed in stages (Bergemann et al. 
2011). But we already address this possibility by adjusting all cash flow downside risk measures for R&D expenditures and 
controlling for the effects of R&D expenditures in all multivariate regressions of cash flow downside risk on conservatism 
measures. As a further check, we use a subsample without R&D expenditures to regress cash flow downside risk on 
conservatism measures using Eq. (7), and find that the negative relation is qualitatively unchanged. 
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the concentration ratio in Hui et al. (2012) by assuming that it is a relative concept depending 
on customer bargaining power of a firm and its customers. When using these measures to re-
examine H2a and H2b regarding the indirect effects of conservatism on cash flow downside 
risk via maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those in Table 3. 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates whether accounting conservatism serves a risk management role 
for operating cash flows as follows from its definition and suggestive prior findings that it 
influences operating cash flows downside properties, a key focus of risk management theory 
and practice. Our findings indicate that (1) unconditional and conditional conservatism 
mitigate subsequent cash flow downside risk; (2) they operate by reducing cash-debt maturity 
mismatches associated with supply side disruptions, and by weakening the effects of 
customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk; and (3) unconditional (conditional) 
conservatism substitutes for (complements) hedging usage in reducing operating cash flow 
downside risk. 
This study contributes to the conservatism literature by articulating a risk management 
role of accounting conservatism and providing supportive evidence. We further advance 
insights into relations between conservatism and operating cash flow downside risk via 
maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power that help validate the relations. 
Importantly, our evidence that accounting conservatism serves as an accounting-based risk 
management instrument related to hedging extends the risk management literature. Our 
findings also have practical implications for economic policymaking and accounting standard 
setting by suggesting conservatism as a low-cost accounting-based risk management tool. 
Our results also help inform ongoing deliberations regarding conservatism’s role as a central 
tenet of financial accounting.  This study’s findings of a risk management role for accounting 
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conservatism with regard to operating cash flow downside risk open several avenues for 
future research. In particular, follow-on studies can examine how conservatism relates to 
other risk dimensions and risk management tools, and related implications for managers and 
policymakers. 
  32 
Appendix 1 Benchmark models for operating cash flow 
This study utilizes the following cash flow prediction model for calculating cash flow RRLPM and DOCF: 
OCFt+1 = β0 + β1OCFt + β2OCFt-1 + β3OCFt-2 + β4SALEt + β5Sizet + β8Leveraget + β6STD_OCFt (A1) 
+ Year_Dummies + εt+1 
where OCF refers to the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. Eq. (A1) combines an autoregressive AR (3) 
structure with the economic determinants of cash flow. We incorporate the autoregressive structure because 
Dechow et al. (1998) report that it improves cash flow predictability for future cash flow. We also include sales 
turnover SALE, measured as the ratio of total sales to total assets, because it is a major determinant of both cash 
flow and earnings, as suggested by Barth et al. (2001) and Dechow et al. (1998). Further, SALE can replace the 
earnings-based profitability measure, another documented determinant of future cash flow (e.g., Barth et al. 
2005; Kim and Kross 2005), has the advantage of not introducing endogeneity between conservatism and cash 
flow downside risk, unlike earnings. Both Size and the operating cycle OC are employed as determinants for 
cash flow in prior research (e.g., Dechow et al. 1998). However, Hui et al. (2012) suggest that conservatism 
shortens operating cycles by increasing trading contract efficiencies and therefore we omit it from Eq. (A1). Eq. 
(A1) also includes Leverage, which has dual effects on cash flow. Opler and Titman (1994) document that 
financially distressed firms lose significant market shares to their healthy counterparts during industry 
downturns, and Froot et al. (1993) suggest that higher leverage causes firms to forgo positive net present value 
projects due to costly external financing. Leverage also proxies for interest expenses when firm size is controlled 
for. SFAS No. 95 requires reporting interest expenses as a cash flow item rather than as a financing flow item, 
which results in a negative mechanical relation between Leverage and subsequent cash flow. However, high 
Leverage also implies that firms have already used sufficient external financing to support operations and 
investment activities, which increases subsequent cash flow. Therefore, the relation between Leverage and cash 
flow is an open empirical question. Industry cash flow risk is a determinant of cash flow predictability, yet 
estimation by the industry at least partially controls for this industry effect. In addition, firm-specific cash flow 
risk increases cash flow uncertainty and difficulties in predicting cash flow (Minton et al. 2002). Therefore we 
include cash flow volatility STD_OCF in Eq. (A1) and calculate it as the volatility of quarterly cash flow over 
the current and previous eleven fiscal quarters, with a minimum requirement of four quarters of data. STD_OCF 
thus calculated avoids missing data, as does cash flow volatility calculated using annual cash flow, and we find 
that they are positively correlated, suggesting that the former is an appropriate substitute for the latter in our 
research setting. Lastly, we add year dummies to capture temporal factors that affect cash flow predictability. 
Following the intuition of Stein et al. (2001), we delete firm–years below the lower-tail five percent of total 
assets for a given fiscal year to alleviate concerns that small firm size could disproportionately inflate the cash 
flow ratio and bias cash flow predictions, which results in 73,598 firm–year observations. We fit Eq. (A1) by 
Fama–French (1997) industry classifications and the average R-square is 0.2390. We fit the model by industry 
rather than by year because cash flow properties are shaped more by industry features. The average R-square 
drops from about twenty-four to eighteen percent when the model is fitted by fiscal year with industry dummies. 
The coefficients for OCFt, OCFt-2, SALEt, and Sizet are significantly positive in most industries, but those for 
Leverage are mixed (significantly positive in eight industries and significantly negative in seven industries), 
consistent with mixed evidence in prior studies. The mean values and t-statistics of the estimated coefficients for 
Eq. (A1) are as follows: 
OCFt+1 = -0.0016 + 0.2407*OCFt + 0.0158*OCFt-1 + 0.0157*OCFt-2 + 0.0339*SALEt 
 (-0.08)     (4.73)***            (0.85)                 (2.59)**               (3.89)*** 
+ 0.0092*Sizet  - 0.01*LEVERAGEt - 0.0048*STD_OCFt + Year_Dummies 
   (6.26)***       (-0.00)                       (-0.11) 
 When we use the market value of equity to deflate cash flow, the results are qualitatively unchanged. We 
use estimated residuals and fitted values from Eq. (A1) to calculate the DOCF and Rlpm_OCF used in our main 
tests. We also use ROA instead of SALE in Eq. (A1) and the results are qualitatively unchanged as well, 
indicating that the endogeneity problem induced by ROA is not serious. We also include the operating cycle OC 
in Eq. (A1), with OC defined as the average time between purchasing or acquiring inventory and receiving cash 
from the sales and calculated as the natural logarithm of 360 days times the ratios of average accounts 
receivable to total revenue and of average inventory to the cost of goods. The results are qualitatively unchanged 
for this treatment. We also find that the coefficients of OC are insignificant for most industries and the addition 
of OC does not greatly improve the R-squared statistic. 
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Appendix 2 Variable definitions 
 
Cash flow downside risk measures 
DOCF: a dummy variable indicating that cash flow is below its expected level from a benchmark model for a 
given fiscal year. It is equal to one if the residual from the model is negative and zero otherwise. See Appendix 
1 for the cash flow expectation model used for calculating DOCF. 
Rlpm_OCF: the ranked natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus the cash flow RLPM to one plus the cash flow 
RUPM, calculated over a rolling window of the current and previous two years. See the text and Appendix 1 
for the cash flow expectation model for calculating Rlpm_OCF. 
CFaR: the ranked percentage cash flow shortfall below the expected quarterly cash flow at a one percent 
confidence level. It is estimated from a probability distribution of the quarterly cash flow of a firm and its peers, 
using the comparables approach. 
 
Accounting conservatism measures 
UC_PCA: proxy for unconditional conservatism, measured as the factor score from a PCA of three 
unconditional conservatism measures: UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES. The eigenvectors are 0.7078 for 
UC_ACC, 0.6978 for UC_BM, and 0.2038 for UC_RES; the eigenvalues are 1.0293 for UC_ACC, 0.9989 for 
UC_BM, and 0.9718 for UC_RES; the final communities are 0.5009 for UC_ACC, 0.4669 for UC_BM, and 
0.0415 for UC_RES. 
UC_ACC: a component unconditional conservatism measure calculated as negative one times the ratio of total 
accruals to average total assets, over a rolling window of the current and prior two years. Total accruals are 
calculated as net income before extraordinary items - operating cash flow + depreciation expense. 
UC_BM: a component unconditional conservatism measure calculated as the industry-adjusted ranking of 
negative one times book to market value of common equity at the fiscal year-end. 
UC_RES: a component of the unconditional conservatism measure, calculated as the ratio of hidden reserve 
resulting from last-in, first-out R&D and marketing expenses to total assets. 
CC_PCA: proxy for conditional conservatism, measured as the factor score from a PCA of three conditional 
conservatism measures: CC_ACM, CC_ARA, and CC_CRA. The eigenvectors are 0.7154 for CC_ACM,  0.2436 
for CC_ARA, and 0.7461 for CC_CRA; the eigenvalues are 1.1277 for CC_ACM, 0.9971 for CC_ARA, and 
0.8752 for CC_CRA; the final communities are 0.5718 for CC_ACM, 0.0593 for CC_ARA, and 0.5566 for 
CC_CRA. 
CC_ACM: a component conditional conservatism measure, computed as negative one times the ratio of 
accumulated non-operating accruals to accumulated total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the current 
and prior two years, with non-operating accruals calculated as Total accruals - Δaccounts receivable - 
Δinventories - Δprepaid expenses + Δaccounts payable + Δtaxes payable. 
CC_ARA: a component conditional conservatism measure calculated as the ranked ratio of the sum of the 
CScore_ACC and GScore_ACC to the GScore_ACC estimated from an extended model from Khan and Watts 
(2009), detailed in the text. CScore_ACC (GScore_ACC) score measures the timeliness of bad (good) accruals 
news, corresponding to the C-score (G-score) in Khan and Watts (2009) that measures the timeliness of bad 
(good) earnings news. 
CC_CRA: a component conditional conservatism measure calculated as the ratio of current accrual shocks to 
total accrual news for bad accrual news, with the ratio multiplied by negative one in good accrual news cases, 
derived from Biddle et al. (2013). 
 
Measures for other testing variables 
Mismatch: proxy for maturity mismatch measured as the ratio of the difference between current debt and cash 
holdings to total assets. 
Rsize: proxy for customer bargaining power and is measured as the ratio of the average market value of a 
customer’s industry to the firm’s equity market value and then deflated by 100, with the industry market value 
estimated using all listed firms in a four-digit NAICS industry, following Hui et al. (2012). 
Hedger: a dummy variable equal to one for firms with a hedging program and zero otherwise. 
 
Measures for control variables 
ΔCash: the ratio of changes in cash holdings to total assets. 
Dissue: the ratio of net long-term debt issuance over long-term debt reduction to total assets. 
DIV: the ratio of cash dividends to total assets. 
Growth: the ratio of sale changes in the current fiscal year to sales in the previous fiscal year. 
Invest_CAPX: the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
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Invest_RD: the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. 
Leverage: the ratio of the sum of long-term and short-term debts to total assets. 
LOSS: a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has negative income for the current fiscal year and zero 
otherwise. 
NWC: the ratio of working capital net of cash holdings to total assets. 
OO: the ratio of total property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
ROA: the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Sigma: the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns calculated over the prior twelve months. 
Size: the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity, total liabilities, and the carrying value of 
preferred stock. 
SLACK: the average of the industry-adjusted ratio of inventory to total revenue, the industry-adjusted ratio of 
accounts receivable to total revenue, and the industry-adjusted ratio of selling, general, and administrative 
expense to total revenue. 
SLACK_EMP: the industry-adjusted ratio of the total number of employees at fiscal year-end to total revenue. 
INT_BD: the ratio of interest expense to operating income before depreciation and interest. 
INT: the interaction of R&D investment (Invest_RD) and the leverage ratio (Leverage). 
NOL: an indicator variable equal to one for positive net income and positive net operating loss carryforwards 
and zero otherwise. 
CEO_Vega: the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of CEO firm-specific equity-based wealth to a one 
percent change in stock return volatility. 
CEO_Delta: the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of CEO firm-specific equity-based wealth to a one 
percent change in stock price. 
BAS: the average daily percentage of the bid–ask spread in the fiscal year. 
CAP: the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. 
3M: the change in the three-month T-bill rate. 
Repo: proxy for bond market illiquidity measured as the difference between the three-month general collateral 
repo rate and the three-month T-bill rate. 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics for main variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the main empirical tests for the full sample of firm–
year observations from 1992 through 2007. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. 
Variables Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
DOCF 0.5798 0.4936 0 1 1 
Rlpm_OCF(Raw) 0.0936 0.2970 -0.0715 0.0360 0.1321 
CFaR(Raw) 0.5329 9.5376 0.1133 0.2018 0.3410 
UC_PCA 0.3778 0.2170 0.1953 0.3809 0.5613 
UC_ACC 0.0027 0.0461 -0.0197 0.0027 0.0241 
UC_BM(Raw) 0.3051 3.8507 -0.1301 0.1500 0.4684 
UC_RES 0.0897 0.2732 0.0000 0.0242 0.1049 
CC_PCA 0.6162 0.3283 0.3731 0.6144 0.8594 
CC_ACM -0.0002 0.0822 -0.0305 0.0072 0.0362 
CC_ARA(Raw) -0.5937 23.0188 -0.7546 -0.7133 -0.6550 
CC_CRA(Raw) -0.0633 8.0455 -0.7135 -0.3564 0.6566 
Mismatch -0.0546 0.1358 -0.1094 -0.0266 0.0137 
Rsize 9.2331 11.9608 3.3163 5.6149 10.2255 
ΔCash -0.0068 0.9585 -0.0133 0.0028 0.0307 
Invest_CAPX 0.0627 0.4102 0.0223 0.0429 0.4102 
Invest_RD 0.0291 0.0612 0.0000 0.0000 0.0325 
DISSUE 0.0040 0.0528 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DIV 0.0072 0.0216 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 
Leverage 0.1925 0.1621 0.0357 0.1775 0.3061 
NWC 0.1062 0.1963 -0.0207 0.0831 0.2295 
OO 0.5835 0.3978 0.2806 0.5012 0.8114 
ROA 0.0371 0.1011 0.0149 0.0484 0.0840 
Growth 0.0084 4.6875 0.0030 0.0803 0.1623 
INT 0.0032 0.0097 0 0 0.0020 
NOL 0.0777 0.2677 0 0 0 
Sigma 0.4576 0.2476 0.2877 0.3993 0.5579 
Size 1.8449 0.3250 1.6326 1.8813 2.0804 
SLACK -0.3435 2.2937 -0.3728 -0.1488 0.0256 
SLACK_EMP -0.0051 0.1727 -0.0049 -0.0019 0.0005 
CEO_Delta 0.0076 0.0381 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
CEO_Vega 0.0970 1.1365 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 
CAP 0.5395 0.1913 0.3935 0.5280 0.6869 
3M 0.0378 0.0150 0.0295 0.0407 0.0503 
Repo 4.0548 1.6408 3.0500 4.4500 5.4500 
INT_BD 0.1451 5.1587 0.0000 0.0834 0.2452 
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TABLE 2 Correlation matrix for main testing variables for the full sample 
 
This table reports pairwise correlations among downside risk metrics and accrual-based conservatism measures, maturity mismatch, customer bargaining 
power, and hedging dummy. The upper triangle displays Pearson correlations and the lower triangle displays Spearman correlations. The boldfaced figures 
indicate significance beyond the 90 percent confidence level. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. DOCF 1 0.6451 0.0115 -0.0508 -0.0078 -0.0407 -0.0581 -0.0165 -0.0256 -0.0599 -0.0188 0.0403 0.0388 -0.0262 
2. Rlpm_OCF 0.6453 1 0.0084 -0.1197 -0.1627 -0.0784 -0.1125 -0.1373 -0.0806 -0.0714 -0.1545 0.3576 -0.0449 -0.0286 
3. CFaR 0.0531 0.1053 1 0.0114 0.0031 0.0034 0.0456 -0.0017 -0.0062 0.0098 0.0067 0.0068 -0.0194 -0.0070 
4. UC_PCA -0.0533 -0.1226 -0.1004 1 0.2044 0.9697 0.2090 0.1621 0.0978 -0.0556 0.1360 -0.0990 -0.0716 0.0307 
5. UC_ACC -0.0082 -0.1611 -0.0515 0.1973 1 0.0419 0.0950 0.4510 0.4192 -0.0324 0.2705 -0.1606 0.0336 0.0171 
6. UC_BM -0.0418 -0.0799 -0.0917 0.9787 0.0525 1 0.0136 0.0999 0.0296 -0.0681 0.1037 -0.0446 -0.0896 0.1234 
7. UC_RES -0.1121 -0.1690 -0.0933 0.0841 0.0337 -0.0148 1 -0.0007 0.0429 0.0803 -0.0185 -0.0846 -0.0009 -0.0385 
8. CC_PCA -0.0155 -0.1357 -0.0016 0.1627 0.4675 0.0994 -0.0092 1 0.7332 -0.2474 0.7400 -0.0075 -0.0106 0.0392 
9. CC_ACM -0.0257 -0.0817 -0.0345 0.0955 0.4166 0.0277 0.0217 0.7282 1 -0.0280 0.1314 -0.0522 0.0052 0.0224 
10. CC_ARA -0.0661 -0.0810 0.0864 -0.0501 -0.0476 -0.0569 0.0637 -0.2362 -0.0300 1 -0.0421 -0.0720 -0.0276 -0.0994 
11. CC_CRA -0.0192 -0.1550 0.0609 0.1368 0.2949 0.1025 -0.0171 0.7351 0.1311 -0.0421 1 0.0163 -0.0276 0.0285 
12. Mismatch 0.0466 0.2907 0.0692 -0.1046 -0.1385 -0.0489 -0.2277 0.0002 -0.0486 -0.0953 0.0151 1 0.0385 0.0367 
13. Rsize 0.1161 -0.0787 0.0491 -0.0625 0.0460 -0.0991 0.0479 0.0175     0.0809 0.0732 -0.0346 -0.0959 1 -0.0448 
14. Hedger  -0.0262 -0.0326 -0.0325 0.0867 0.0527 0.1279 -0.0329 0.0602     0.0223 -0.0975 0.0455 0.0320  -0.0897 1 
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TABLE 3 Relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk 
 
This table reports the estimation results for regressing subsequent cash flow downside risk against 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures and other controls using the logit model and Fama–
Macbeth cross-sectional regression model. Cash flow downside risk measures are DOCF in the logit model 
and Rlpm_OCF or CFaR in the Fama–Macbeth models. The unconditional and conditional conservatism 
metrics are UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively, in all models. The model specifications are provided in Eq. 
(7) in the text and variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate 





Fama–Macbeth Model for 
Rlpm_OCF 
Fama–Macbeth Model for 
CFaR 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept 0.7236 0.6847 0.7610 0.7484 0.7621 0.7642 0.6268 0.6306 0.6396 
 (4.47)*** (4.24)*** (4.68)*** (46.29)*** (49.7)*** (46.11)*** (18.71)*** (17.97)*** (19.56)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.4812  -0.4507 -0.0270  -0.0158 -0.1252  -0.1154 
 (-5.22)***  (-4.85)*** (-3.19)***  (-1.96)** (-11.38)***  (-10.10)*** 
CC_PCAit-1  -0.1866 -0.1505  -0.0605 -0.0595  -0.0555 -0.0467 
  (-3.25)*** (-2.60)***  (-14.99)*** (-16.49)***  (-11.89)*** (-10.30)*** 
ΔCashit-1 0.0085 0.0086 0.0084 -0.0111 -0.0044 -0.0047 0.0036 0.0077 0.0089 
 (0.58) (0.59) (0.57) (-1.17) (-0.48) (-0.54) (0.58) (1.17) (1.39) 
Invest_CAPXit-1 0.0278 0.0248 0.0277 -0.0038 0.0079 0.0108 -0.2989 -0.3087 -0.287 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.46) (-0.16) (0.33) (0.47) (-5.92)*** (-6.18)*** (-5.77)*** 
Invest_RDit-1 -7.7831 -8.1816 -7.7700 -0.7217 -0.7449 -0.7300 -0.6678 -0.7748 -0.675 
 (-18.51)*** (-19.77)*** (-18.46)*** (-22.71)*** (-22.33)*** (-24.49)*** (-6.04)*** (-7.07)*** (-6.13)*** 
Leverageit-1 1.1349 1.1675 1.1475 0.0729 0.0797 0.0794 0.1823 0.1917 0.1867 
 (8.71)*** (8.95)*** (8.80)*** (15.24)*** (16.23)*** (16.09)*** (9.40)*** (10.19)*** (9.56)*** 
Lossit-1 -0.2183 -0.218 -0.2158 -0.0124 -0.0118 -0.0113 0.0135 0.0141 0.0143 
 (-3.35)*** (-3.33)*** (-3.30)*** (-2.30)** (-2.10)** (-2.04)** (2.32)** (2.35)** (2.43)** 
OOit-1 -0.2865 -0.2777 -0.2679 -0.0220 -0.0159 -0.0157 -0.0462 -0.0417 -0.0411 
 (-4.81)*** (-4.63)*** (-4.46)*** (-2.55)** (-2.04)** (-1.95)* (-6.11)*** (-5.99)*** (-5.62)*** 
ROAit-1 -4.1294 -4.3212 -4.1880 -0.4117 -0.4394 -0.4359 -0.0325 -0.0671 -0.0528 
 (-14.80)*** (-15.33)*** (-14.92)*** (-18.59)*** (-17.30)*** (-18.23)*** (-0.43) (-0.81) (-0.67) 
Sigmait-1 -0.1871 -0.1875 -0.1798 -0.0198 -0.019 -0.0179 -0.1701 -0.1739 -0.1687 
 (-2.10)** (-2.10)** (-2.01)** (-2.69)*** (-2.52)** (-2.50)** (-10.79)*** (-10.51)*** (-10.35)*** 
Sizeit-1 0.051 0.0471 0.0557 0.0024 0.0039 0.0041 -0.024 -0.0257 -0.0227 
 (4.39)*** (4.07)*** (4.74)*** (1.47) (2.61)** (2.90)*** (-3.94)*** (-4.34)*** (-3.91)*** 
Slackit-1 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0073 -0.0044 -0.0046 0.0077 0.0107 0.0101 
 (-0.01) (0.11) (0.07) (-2.43)** (-1.49) (-1.56) (2.24)** (2.65)** (2.56)** 
Slack_empit-1 7.0804 6.953 7.0257 0.2968 0.257 0.2563 0.2409 0.1918 0.2025 
 (5.00)*** (4.92)*** (4.97)*** (3.15)*** (3.20)*** (3.15)*** (0.89) (0.76) (0.78) 
CEO_ Deltait-1 -1.8426 -1.753 -1.8529 -0.1142 -0.1061 -0.1080 -0.0170 -0.0027 -0.0162 
 (-4.05)*** (-3.86)*** (-4.06)*** (-5.86)*** (-5.54)*** (-5.55)*** (-0.78) (-0.11) (-0.68) 
CEO_Vegait-1 -0.008 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0174 -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0024 
 (-0.59) (-0.55) (-0.56) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.90) (-0.96) (-0.90) 
Year and Ind. 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 27,018 27,018 27,018 
Psuedo R-square 0.4855 0.4850 0.4856       
R-square    0.7892 0.7925 0.7932 0.3944 0.391 0.3972 
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TABLE 4 Maturity mismatch, customer bargaining power, and relations between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk 
 
This table reports the second- and third-stage estimation results for examining the effects of maturity 
mismatch and customer bargaining power on relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism 
and cash flow downside risk using a system of OLS regressions. Maturity mismatch and customer bargaining 
power are proxied by Mismatch and Rsize, respectively. The model specifications are detailed in Eqs. (8) to 
(10) in the text and variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
Effects of Maturity 
Mismatch 
Effects of Customer Bargaining 
Power  
Mismatchit Rlpm_OCFit Rsizeit   Rlpm_OCFit 
Intercept 0.0769 -0.0060 14.3700 0.6394 
 (8.57)*** (-1.70)* (5.00)*** (8.71)*** 
Mismatch_Rit-1  0.0184   
  (3.75)***   
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Mismatch_Rit-1  0.0221   
  (0.64)   
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Mismatch_Rit-1  0.0031   
  (0.21)   
Rsize_Rit-1     0.0006 
    (1.11) 
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Rsize_Rit-1    -0.0026 
    (-2.24)** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Rsize_R it-1    -0.0157 
    (-2.97)*** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1 -0.0721 -0.0029 -5.4600 0.0538 
 (-13.47)*** (-0.92) (-0.77) (0.63) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1 -0.0104 -0.0199 0.6390 -0.1259  
 (-4.37)*** (-15.05)*** (0.50) (-7.25)*** 
ΔCashit-1  -0.0000  0.1549 
  (-0.02)  (3.69)*** 
Invest_CAPXit-1  -0.0012  0.0766 
   (-1.39)  (0.82) 
Invest_RDit-1  -0.5895  -0.6536 
  (-66.22)***  (-8.38)*** 
Leverageit-1  0.0334  0.2591 
   (11.77)***  (5.45)*** 
Lossit-1  -0.0081  0.0133 
   (-5.60)***  (0.82) 
OOit-1  -0.0296  0.0760 
   (-22.95)***  (2.45)** 
ROAit-1 0.0971 -0.3507  -0.3879 
 (12.09)*** (-58.25)***  (-5.91)*** 
Sigmait-1  0.0027  -0.0664 
   (1.29)  (-1.85)* 
Sizeit-1 -0.0005 0.0060  -0.0096 
  (-1.22) (25.41)***  (-1.91)* 
Slackit-1  0.0004  0.0006 
   (1.59)  (0.16) 
Slack_empit-1  0.0323  0.1184 
  (4.17)***  (0.55) 
CEO_Vegait-1 -0.0002 -0.0005  -0.0229 
 (-0.24) (-1.46)  (-1.20) 
CEO_Deltait-1 -0.1324 -0.0539  0.0016 
 (-7.00)*** (-5.32)***  (-0.00) 
CAPit-1 -0.2835    
 (-64.78)***    
Repoit-1 -0.0141    
 (-2.34)**    
3Mit-1 2.4366    
 (4.03)***    
Year and Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,631 23,800 908 819 
R-square 0.2661 0.3476 0.1228  0.7579 
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TABLE 5 Corporate hedging and relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow 
downside risk 
 
This table reports the estimation results for examining relations of unconditional and conditional 
conservatism measure UC_PCA and CC_PCA with hedging in affecting cash flow downside risk proxied by 
Rlpm_OCF, using an extended three-stage Heckman (1979) model. The model specifications are provided in 
Eqs. (11) to (13) in the text and variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 






Model for Hedger 
3rd-Stage Model 
for Rlpm_OCF 
Intercept  0.0747 0.4794 -1.3732 0.6011 
 (9.86)*** (26.24)*** (-14.16)*** (27.39)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 0.7234    
 (152.55)***    
CC_PCAit-1  0.1596   
  (20.23)***   
UC_PCA_Rit-1   -0.1587 -0.0119 
   (-1.64)* (-0.97) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1   0.0705 -0.0470 
   (1.77)* (-9.48)*** 
Hedgerit-1   0.0170 0.0110   
 (7.20)*** (1.98)**   
Hedgerit-1*postit-1    -0.0108 
    (-2.35)** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1     0.0580 
*Hedger*postit-1     (2.31)** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1     0.0069 
*Hedger*postit-1     (0.75) 
Rlpm_OCFit-1 -0.0612 -0.2712   
 (-14.94)*** (-27.53)***   
INT_BDit-1   0.0041  
   (1.21)  
Invest_RDit-1    3.9362  
*Leverageit-1   (2.11)**  
NOLit-1   0.0045  
   (0.10)  
BASit-1   -10.1451  
   (-11.96)***  
ΔCashit-1    -0.0028 
    (-1.52) 
Invest_CAPXit-1    0.0022 
    (1.07) 
Invest_RDit-1   -0.4089 -0.7471 
   (-1.23) (-25.29)*** 
Leverageit-1 0.0064 0.2454 0.6895 0.0662 
 (0.90) (14.54)*** (7.35)*** (7.19)*** 
Lossit-1    -0.0121 
    (-2.61)** 
OOit-1    -0.0062 
    (-1.52) 
ROAit-1 -0.1065 -0.3328 1.4424 -0.4275 
 (-9.09)*** (-11.79)*** (8.31)*** (-221.57)*** 
Sigmait-1   -0.0848 -0.0130 
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   (-1.32) (-2.02)** 
Sizeit-1 0.0048 0.0272 0.0441 0.0088 
 (8.29)*** (19.75)*** (5.47)*** (9.26)*** 
Slackit-1    0.0003 
    (0.43) 
Slack_empit-1    0.0160 
     (0.80) 
 CEO_ Deltait-1  0.0256 -0.1087 -1.7097  -0.2000 
 (0.92) (-1.65)* (-4.82)***  (-5.89)*** 
 CEO_Vegait-1 0.0028 -0.0021 0.0446  0.0040 
 (1.85)* (-0.57) (2.50)**  (2.11)** 
Postit-1    0.1036 
    (5.66)*** 
 Millsit-1     0.0733 
     (6.96)*** 
Year and Ind. 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,250 16,250 13,391 12,068 
Pseudo R_square   0.1054  
R_square 0.6657 0.1441  0.7767 
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TABLE 6 Investor monitoring and relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash 
flow downside risk 
 
This table reports the estimation results for regressing subsequent cash flow downside risk on measures for 
unconditional and conditional conservatism, controlling for the effects of investor monitoring, such as 
blockholder monitoring, GScore; institutional investor monitoring, Inst_Own; and debtholder monitoring, 
Mon_Debt. The columns 1st-stage UC_PCA Model and 1st-stage CC_PCA Model report the results for OLS 
regressions of unconditional and conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively, on 
lagged GScore, Inst_Own, Mon_Debt, and other controls. The residuals from these regressions, UC_PCA_R 
and CC_PCA_R, together with investor monitoring measures GScore, Inst_Own, and Mon_Debt, are used in 
the second-stage Rlpm_OCF regressions reported in the last three columns. The model specifications are 
provided in Eq. (7) in the text and variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. *, **, and *** indicate 


















Intercept 0.0601 0.2879 0.7075 0.7071 0.7060 
 (2.59)*** (4.13)*** (19.22)*** (19.33)*** (19.28)*** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1   -0.3636  -0.3251 
   (-1.97)***  (-1.74)*** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1    -0.1483 -0.1309 
    (-2.45)** (-2.13)** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Gscoreit-1   -0.0105  -0.0100 
   (-1.07)  (-1.00) 
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Inst_Ownit-1   0.2043  0.2038 
   (1.38)  (1.36) 
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Mon_debtit-1   0.0920  0.0846 
   (0.69)  (0.62) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Gscoreit-1    -0.0025 -0.0019 
    (-0.75) (-0.56) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Inst_Ownit-1    0.0542 0.0409 
    (1.05) (0.78) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Mon_debtit-1    0.0447 0.0424 
    (1.08) (1.01) 
Gscoreit-1 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 
 (1.58) (-0.52) (-1.52) (-1.59) (-1.57) 
Inst_Ownit-1 0.0233 0.0742 -0.0167 -0.0184 -0.0174 
 (1.83)* (1.96)** (-0.96) (-1.06) (-1.00) 
Mon_debtit-1 0.0098 0.0451 0.0387 0.0376 0.0387 
 (0.96) (1.48) (2.91)*** (2.84)*** (2.92)*** 
Other Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 4,142 4,142 3,035 3,035 3,035 
R-square 0.7096 0.0877 0.7992 0.8014 0.8018 
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TABLE 7 Alternative measures and relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash 
flow downside risk 
 
This table reports the estimation results for examining whether relations between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk are robust to alternative measures for cash flow 
downside risk and unconditional and conditional conservatism. Panel A reports the results for alternative cash 
flow downside risk measures Rlpm_OCFind, Rlpm_OCFzero, Rlpm_OCFpre, Rlpm_OCF2, and Rlpm_OCF3. 
DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre, and DR_OCFzero refer to the cash flow RRLPMs calculated by replacing the 
cash flow expectation model in (5) with the industry mean of cash flow in the previous year, the mean of 
firm-specific cash flow, and zero cash flow, respectively. Rlpm_OCF2 is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
cash flow RLPM without deflating by the cash flow RUPM and Rlpm_OCF3 refers to the natural logarithm 
of one plus the cash flow RLPM deflated by the standard deviation of cash flow. The unconditional and 
conditional conservatism measures in Panel A are UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively. Panels B to D report 
the results for alternative unconditional conservatism metrics that are component measures for UC_PCA—
UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES—and for alternative conditional conservatism metrics that are component 
measures for CC_PCA—CC_ACM, CC_ARA, and CC_CRA. Panel E reports the results for the alternative 
conditional conservatism metrics CC_Skew and CC_PCAA. Cash flow downside risk measures are DOCF in 
the logit models in Panel B and Rlpm_OCF and CFaR in Panels C and D, respectively. The model 
specifications are provided in Eq. (7) in the text and variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
 Panel A: Alternative Rlpm_OCF-based cash flow downside risk measures 









Intercept 0.8882 0.8374 0.5892 0.5994 0.5299 
 (56.48)*** (47.30)*** (14.28)*** (26.80)*** (24.28)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.1643 -0.1756 -0.0677 -0.0359 -0.0811 
 (-17.99)*** (-22.97)*** (-5.14)*** (-7.67)*** (-20.73)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.1771 -0.1899 -0.1693 -0.1165 -0.1136 
 (-52.49)*** (-78.04)*** (-35.61)*** (-52.53)*** (-47.73)*** 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,456 22,456 22,456 28,425 28,425 
R-square 0.5667 0.5449 0.1686 0.3725 0.3266 
Panel B: Alternative conservatism measures in logit models for DOCF 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.7818 0.8380 0.7853 0.7978 0.8309 1.0104 
 (4.75)*** (5.07)*** (4.78)*** (4.84)*** (5.04)*** (5.91)*** 
UC_ACCit-1 0.1516      
 (0.33)      
UC_BMit-1  -0.2542     
  (-3.70)***     
UC_RES it-1   -0.2924    
   (-4.71)***    
CC_ACM it-1    -0.6279   
    (-2.79)***   
CC_ARAit-1     -0.1620  
     (-2.50)***  
CC_CRAit-1      -0.3117 
      (-4.38)*** 
UC_PCAit-1    -0.4418 -0.4386 -0.4604 
    (-4.77)*** (-4.73)*** (-5.00)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.1858 -0.1628 -0.1798    
 (-2.97)*** (-2.82)*** (-3.13)***    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 
R-square 0.4852 0.4856 0.4857 0.4859 0.4861 0.4858 
Panel C: Alternative conservatism measures in Fama–MacBeth regressions for Rlpm_OCF 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.7679 0.7752 0.7755 0.7694 0.7713 0.7774 
 (42.85)*** (41.60)*** (43.85)*** (43.84)*** (43.25)*** (39.90)*** 
UC_ACCit-1 -0.1911      
 (-3.58)***      
  47 
UC_BMit-1  -0.0044     
  (-0.76)     
UC_RES it-1   -0.0305    
   (-2.83)***    
CC_ACM it-1    -0.0221   
    (-6.29)***   
CC_ARAit-1     -0.0150  
     (-4.44)***  
CC_CRAit-1      -0.0812 
      (-14.95)*** 
UC_PCAit-1    -0.0220 -0.0241 -0.0132 
    (-2.68)*** (-2.85)*** (-1.61) 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.0486 -0.0595 -0.0600    
 (-10.85)*** (-16.67)*** (-15.41)***    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 
R-square 0.7943 0.7940 0.7937 0.7906 0.7903 0.7960 
Panel D: Alternative conservatism measures in Fama–MacBeth regressions for CFaR 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.6510 0.6724 0.6712 0.6796 0.6616 0.6674 
 (17.13)*** (17.88)*** (17.46)*** (18.49)*** (15.11)*** (16.84)*** 
UC_ACCit-1 -0.5526      
 (-14.24)**      
UC_BMit-1  -0.0668     
  (-8.94)***     
UC_RES it-1   -0.1038    
   (-2.21)**    
CC_ACM it-1    -0.0502   
    (-11.56)**   
CC_ARAit-1     -0.0008  
     (-0.08)  
CC_CRAit-1      -0.0261 
      (-3.66)*** 
UC_PCAit-1    -0.1093 -0.1171 -0.1121 
    (-11.47)*** (-11.77)*** (-10.96)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.0211 -0.0494 -0.0534    
 (-4.91)*** (-13.28)*** (-14.07)***    
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 
R-square 0.4017 0.3993 0.3986 0.4011 0.3990 0.3998 
Panel E: CC_Skew and CC_PCAA as alternative conditional conservatism measures  
Variables 
Logit Models for DOCF Fama MacBeth Models for Rlpm_OCF 
Fama MacBeth Models 
for CFaR 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.8718 0.9115 0.7594 0.7546 0.8303 0.8181 
 (5.74)*** (5.94)*** (37.80)*** (36.86)*** (10.89)*** (10.37)*** 
CC_Skewit-1  0.0271  -0.0677  -0.1261 
  (0.44)  (-3.66)***  (-4.66)*** 
CC_PCAAit-1 -0.0770  -0.0779  -0.0783  
 (-1.36)  (-5.89)***  (-7.36)***  
UC_PCAit-1 -0.4568 -0.4874 -0.0070 -0.0149 -0.1036 -0.1014 
 (-4.92)*** (-5.26)*** (-0.85) (-1.76)* (-15.98)*** (-17.34)*** 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 24,554 24,554 
Psuedo R-square 0.4857 0.4857     
R-square   0.7955 0.7924 0.4258 0.4271 
 
 
